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military-industrial complex, an understudied subject, is
important in this connection and as a problem in its own
right. The defense sector would wish to have weapons
gaps become political issues during presidential cam-
paigns, and more generally would resist for economic
reasons any shrinking of the defense base (as, for ex-
ample, in the contemporary controversy over proposed
American military base closures).
Finally, the study is important for demonstrating that
internationally consequential political developments
can be unrelated to national intelligence. Eisenhower
shared with Kennedy the latest intelligence about the
superpower balance of forces during the campaign, but
Kennedy "chose instead to believe unofficial estimates,
promulgated by journalists and maverick military offic-
ers, that inflated Soviet missile strength" (p. 4). The re-
cent American invasion of Iraq affords another case of
major decision making not being based on national in-
telligence.
Preble's study has weaknesses. First, the political im-
pact of the military-industrial complex as the author de-
fines it is unproven here. Kennedy did make important
gains over Adlai Stevenson's showing in 1956 in areas
in which defense production employment was cut, yet
Preble does not establish that those gains were more
substantial than gains made elsewhere for Kennedy's
victory, and in San Diego, for example, a city hard hit
by defense cutbacks, they were not determinative, the
California electorate remaining in the Republican col-
umn. Finally, the military-industrial complex does not
seem to have been important in stimulating the
Kennedy administration's defense buildup, although
the administration used the missile gap as a cover to
legitimate the buildup.
Second, Preble leaves unresolved the question of how
important national intelligence information was in this
episode. He notes "the confusion and uncertainty in-
herent in the intelligence of that era" about Soviet
forces (p. 69); the more "confused" the intelligence, the
more justified Kennedy was in seeking alternative
sources of information aijout the Soviet missile buildup.
Preble believes it "highly unlikely" that Central Intel-
ligence Agency Director Allen Dulles, who briefed
Kennedy on behalf of the Eisenhower administration,
would have told him there was no missile gap (p. 165).
Yet intelligence about Soviet missile strength, a key as-
set obtained from highly sensitive U-2 overflights of the
Soviet Union, warranted optimism; the U-2s failed to
discover even one operational Soviet ICBM during
Eisenhower's administration (p. 109). In light of this,
Preble's point about "Kennedy's . . . continued confu-
sion over the nature of the Soviet arms buildup" (p.
169) is hard to understand. Eisenhower, who controlled
the U-2 flights, was manifestly not confused about the
buildup.
BARRY H . STEINER
Califomia State University,
Long Beach
ROBERT MASON. Richard Nixon and the Quest for a New
Majority. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press. 2004. Pp. 289. $39.95.
How did the United States voting public make the tran-
sition from a solidly Democratic majority based on the
liberalism of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal coali-
tion to an era of heightened conservatism but no dis-
cernable governing party, skipping a major partisan re-
alignment in the process? Robert Mason, in his finely
crafted examination of the era of Richard M. Nixon,
argues that while the transition started in the early
1960s with the rise of Arizona's conservative Senator
Barry Goldwater, it was really Nixon who envisioned
the possibility of a major transformation and attempted
an ambitious, and risky, strategy to achieve a "new ma-
jority" in the United States. That Nixon failed to
achieve his vision should not deflect us from recogniz-
ing the strategic brilliance that animated this effort.
Goldwater's disastrous bid for the presidency in 1964
sparked a re-evaluation of partisan politics in the
United States. Into the void stepped Nixon. For Nixon,
it was a combination of personal ambition and partisan
opportunity that led him to attempt a major political
transformation of American politics. His ambition was
great, but the risks also were great.
In the 1960s, the old order was severely challenged.
The war in Vietnam, crime, student protests, racial un-
rest, urban violence, the rise of the counter culture, and
the failure of the left to meet these challenges effec-
tively led to an opportunity for Republicans to attack
the prevailing orthodoxy. As Mason writes, "The pro-
found disruptions within American society provided a
good opportunity for a candidate in opposition to [Pres-
ident] Johnson and a party in opposition to the Dem-
ocrats" (p. 23). Republicans, for the first time in thirty
years, entertained the possibility they might become the
majority party in America. The intellectual drive came
from the writings of Nixon staffer Kevin Phillips, in his
influential book The Emerging Republican Majority
(1969), and Democratic analysts Richard Scammon and
Ben Wattenberg, whose work. The Real Majority (1971),
gave support to the possibility of realignment. The po-
litical impetus came from Nixon's political and personal
ambitions.
Mason traces Nixon's new majority strategy to Gold-
water's concern for "the forgotten Americans," the
white middle and middle-lower class who paid their
taxes, did their jobs, stayed out of trouble, but were ig-
nored by the interest-group-dominated Democratic
Party. Nixon morphed Goldwater's forgotten Ameri-
cans into his own "silent majority." These were the
troops of the new realignment, the potentially switch-
able voters to whom Republicans needed to appeal.
While Mason touches on the role race played in this
strategy, some might argue that he pays far too little
attention to the power of race to drive many middle-
class Americans, especially in the South, into the Re-
publican fold. Prior to the 1960s, the "solid South" re-
ferred to the solidly Democratic South. Today, it means
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solidly Republican. Race played a key role in this trans-
formation, a role that Mason may underemphasize.
Opposition to a growing federal government also
played a role in this transformation. But where Gold-
water was a libertarian conservative, Nixon was a con-
servative internationalist, willing to make his peace
with a burgeoning federal role. It was Ronald Reagan,
a decade later, who brought the antigovernment sen-
timent solidly into the Republican playbook.
Nixon believed that he could woo labor. Catholics,
and the white South into the Republican Party, creating
a new and enduring Republican majority. Primarily on
the basis of "social issues" (most voters were "un-
young, un-poor, and un-black"), Nixon hoped to trans-
form partisan loyalties and convert this transformation
into political clout for his own ambitions. His initial ef-
forts failed to see his new majority materialize, but this
did not deter the president. But as the 1972 election
approached, Nixon jettisoned party for personal gain.
Obsessed with re-election, Nixon largely abandoned his
party in favor of winning a personal victory. This strat-
egy worked fabulously for Nixon—he won in a land-
slide—but proved disastrous for his party. The Dem-
ocrats maintained control of both the House and the
Senate, as well as most state houses.
After Nixon's 1972 victory, the crimes of Watergate
crushed the president and his hopes for a new Repub-
lican majority. Nixon resigned in disgrace, a step ahead
of impeachment and conviction. The Democrats won
the presidency in 1976, and hopes for a new Republican
majority were dashed. But if there was not a new Re-
publican majority, there clearly was movement in the
American electorate. Ticket splitting and de-alignment
occurred; a weakening of partisan loyalties and the rise
of independent voters were also evident. Rather than a
new majority, there was no majority.
Mason does a fine job of bringing us back to the tur-
bulent days of the 1960s and 1970s. He makes excellent
use of archival materials and his writing is lively and
accessible. His argument may not be original, but he
executes his task with skill and insight. While he fails to
take the power of race fully into account in his analysis,
and while he also skates very quickly over Nixon's plan
to govern without Congress via an "administrative strat-
egy," Mason nonetheless helps us grasp the bold stra-
tegic vision of Nixon, the flawed execution of that vi-
sion, and the missed opportunity of the president.
Mason could have focused greater attention on the
messenger: was Nixon the right person to lead a major
partisan transformation? In many ways the answer is
no. Nixon was brilliant but deeply flawed. He was often
his own worst enemy, lacked the communication skills
necessary to lead a major transformation of partisan
loyalties, and, in the end, sacrificed party for personal
victory. It took a Reagan to animate the conservative
movement in the United States, a movement that was
perhaps the final nail in the New Deal coffin, and one
that has left no governing majority for the nation.
MICHAEL A. GENOVESE
Loyola Marymount University
ERIC ALTERMAN. When Presidents Lie: A History of Of-
ficial Deception and its Consequences. New York: Vi-
king Press. 2005. Pp. ix, 447. $27.95.
STEPHEN GRAUBARD. Command of Office: How War, Se-
crecy, and Deception Transformed the Presidency, from
Theodore Roosevelt to George W. Bush. New York: Basic
Books. 2005. Pp. xiii, 722. $30.00.
A common theme of these two books is the use of lies
and deception by twentieth-century presidents. For
Eric Alterman this is his central focus. For Stephen
Graubard it is part of a broader analysis that also in-
cludes issues of war and secrecy. Both authors also re-
flect the resurgent interest by historians in presidential
biography.
Yet Alterman and Graubard have written two very
different books. Alterman is concerned with the con-
sequences that presidential lies and deceptions (he
makes no distinction between the two) have had on the
nation's foreign and domestic policies. He does this by
examining the unintended results of presidential mis-
representations of four major events in U.S. foreign
policy: the Yalta Conference of 1945; the Cuban missile
crisis of 1963; the Gulf of Tonkin Incidents of 1964; and
the Iran-Contra scandal of 1986-1987. In contrast,
Graubard is concerned with what he regards as the de-
clining stature of the presidential office for most of the
twentieth century, but especially since the presidency of
Harry S. Truman. In his view, only four modern pres-
idents have been worthy of the office: Theodore Roos-
evelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and
Truman. Beginning with Dwight D. Eisenhower, in-
competency, especially in matters of foreign policy, has,
in his view, increasingly characterized the inhabitants of
the Oval Office. War, secrecy, and deception have all
contributed to this regrettable development. But
Graubard's indictment of the more recent inhabitants
of the White House is more extensive than the subtitle
of his book suggests.
Alterman has written the more compelling of the two
books. In an interesting introductory chapter, which is
part philosophical, part etymological, he attempts to
justify his interchangeable use of deception, evasion,
and outright lies. He also sets the context for the four
case studies that follow. Of those cases, the least per-
suasive is the one on the Yalta Conference. The prob-
lems that emanated from Yalta, he maintains, were not
the result of the failure of the Soviet Union to live up
to the agreements they made but the intentional lies
and deception that Presidents Roosevelt and Truman
allegedly made in presenting the results of the wartime
summit to the American people. Indeed, he goes so far as
to state that "one of the great and, for American democ-
racy, most painful ironies of the beginning of the Cold
War" was that Joseph Stalin "honored the deal" made at
Yalta while "the Americans and their British allies re-
neged. And that's how the Cold War began" (p. 24).
In making this provocative statement, Alterman
claims that Roosevelt not only knew that Stalin had no
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